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PRIVATE FOOD REGULATION FROM A REGULATEE’S 
PERSPECTIVE
Jaap  van der Kloet 
Tetty Havinga*
Abstract
Regulatory regimes may be conceptualised as consisting of three elements: rule-making 
(standard setting), monitoring compliance, and enforcement (administration of sanctions) (Pic­
ciotto 2002, Scott 2002). M any different forms of private regulation exist, examples are: 
corporate social responsibility initiatives, codes of conduct, and private standards. In the p a ­
per we focus on private food standards and aim to explore the meaning of private standards 
for those who are  regulated by them (regulatees). W e  therefore looked at the position of 
regulatees in private regulatory regimes. Three factors seem to affect that position: 1 ) the 
level of exactingness of the regulation for the regulatee, 2) the level of voluntariness to stay 
out of the regulatory regime, 3) the level of the regulatee’s control over the regulatory re­
gimes. From these factors, five research questions were developed: 1) how easy is it for regu­
latees to comply with the standard, 2) is joining the standard voluntary, 3) who sets the rules, 
4) who monitors compliance, and 5) who enforces compliance with these rules? These questions 
are  answered for four private food standards: BRC, G lob a lG A P , M SC, and EKO. W e  con­
clude that the internal organisation and governance structure of private food standards var­
ies highly. The position of regulatees in regulatory regimes has developed in course of time.
Key words
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EXPANSION OF PRIVATE FOOD REGULATION
This paper is about food regulation in international food chains. The way food 
is regulated has changed in recent decades. Governmental bodies used to take 
the lead in rule-making and enforcing compliance. However, over the past 
years several developments have transformed food regulation from traditional 
state regulation into private or mixed forms of regulation.
During the 1990s a number of global food safety incidents1 contributed to 
a decline in consumers’ confidence in the safety and quality of food (FAO 
2006) and in the capacity of regulators to guarantee food safety (Jaffee & 
Masakure 2005). These food safety incidents have made consumers more criti­
cal of the safety, quality and origin of food. In industrial countries, consumers
* Paper prepared for the International Workshop on Globalization, G lobal Governance 
and Private Standards, 4-5 November 2008, Leuven, Belgium. j.vanderkloet@jur.ru.nl; 
t.havinga@jur.ru.nl.
1 Food safety incidents in Europe included the identification of hormones in beef, salmonel­
la in eggs, dioxin in animal feed, E. Coli bacterium in boiled meat, and pesticide residues 
in fruit and vegetables.
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demand a broad assortment of food products of high and consistent quality 
available throughout the year and for competitive prices (Trienekes &  Zuurbier 
2008). Governments reacted to the alleged decline in consumer confidence 
with stricter regulations concerning food safety. Producers and suppliers be­
came primarily responsible for food safety while national governments became 
responsible for controlling the adequacy of risk controlling mechanisms of com­
panies in a food chain. Due to their legal responsibility and because of fear 
for potential reputation damage in case of unsafe food products, private ac­
tors developed initiatives for decreasing food safety risks and increasing con­
sumer confidence in safe food.
Simultaneously with worldwide food scandals and stricter public and pri­
vate regulations, food chains rapidly internationalised (Oosterveer 2005, Tri­
enekes &  Zuurbier 2008). In order to be able to deliver a continuous and di­
verse supply of safe food throughout the year, European food traders felt 
forced to obtain their products from other than national or local markets. This 
development was stimulated by a process of increasing globalisation in which 
borders became less visible or disappeared entirely and new techniques for 
storage enabled food products to remain fresh after transport. Furthermore, 
economic growth and the related increase of household incomes have stimulat­
ed the internationalisation of food chains. As a result, the current food industry 
has been transformed towards an interconnected system with a large variety 
of complex relationships (Oosterveer 2005; Piciotto 2002; Trienekes &  Zuurbi­
er 2008).
In the context of these developments new forms of food regulation 
emerged, including private standards, corporate social responsibility initiatives, 
and codes of conduct. The transformation from traditional state regulation to­
wards less state centred forms of regulation, involved a new relationship and a 
renewed allocation of responsibilities between government bodies on the one 
side and private actors on the other. These new forms are characterised by a 
less dominant role for the government and more responsibilities for private ac­
tors (Havinga 2003, Oosterveer 2005). Regulation is conceptualised as consist­
ing of three elements: rule-making, monitoring compliance, and enforcement 
(Picciotto 2002, Scott 2002). In the traditional model of regulation rule-making 
was reserved for the legislative body, monitoring compliance for inspectorates, 
and enforcement for courts. New forms of food regulation include not only pub­
lic actors, but also private actors who are involved in rule making, monitoring 
compliance, and enforcement. Private actors include firms, NGOs and other 
organisations both inside and outside the production chain. An example of an 
actor inside the production chain is a retailer; an example of an actor outside 
the production chain is a private audit or certification organisation. Recent 
trends are the dominant role of retailers, the emergence of global coalitions 
for setting standards and an increased use of global business to business 
standards and of third party certification (Fulponi 2006, Harrison 1997, Hat-
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anaki &  Busch 2008), and a move from a prescriptive towards an enforced 
self-regulating approach (Martinez et. al. 2007).
The renewed regulation of food has implications for all actors in interna­
tional food chains, from food industries to primary producers and from food 
importers to food exporters. Many private food regulations have been devel­
oped in Western Europe and other OECD2 countries. However, the consequenc­
es of these regulations did not stop at national borders. Actors in international 
food chains are required to comply with private norms that were originally set 
in Western countries. Private food regulations from European retailers are de­
clared applicable to producers, processors and traders all over the world, in­
cluding developing countries. A few years ago, most major OECD retailers re­
quired certification of products from developing countries against a private 
food standard such as G lobalGAP or BRC, whereas this is not always required 
from domestic producers (Fulponi 2006: 7, 9). This rises the question what im­
pact these rules have on actors in developing countries who are regulated by 
them (regulatees). They find themselves governed by private regulations initial­
ly developed in and for a Western context. However, things are different in 
developing countries. An adequate infrastructure to enforce food quality and 
safety norms is not available everywhere (Henson &  Reardon 2005, Trienekes
&  Zuurbier 2008) and developing country markets are not all (sufficiently) 
equipped for competition based on food quality and safety norms (Jaffee & 
Masakure 2005). Furthermore, capital for investments may not be accessible 
for everybody. This forms the starting point of the PhD research of one of the 
authors of this paper.3 That research aims at comparing the effect of private 
food safety regulation for primary producers in the Netherlands and Kenya. 
This paper links up with that research and can be considered as a first elabo­
ration of the research theme.
In literature, private food regulation has been examined from the perspec­
tive of the state (e.g. George 2005), of private regulators (e.g. Gereffi 1 999, 
Kaplinsky 2000, Reardon et al. 2001), or of retailers (e.g. Havinga 2003, 
Balsevich et al 2003, Fulponi 2006, Henson 2006), taking an economic per­
spective (e.g. Baldwin 2001, Gereffi et al 2001, Jostling et al 2004, Raynolds 
2004, OECD 2006), or focussing on effectiveness (e.g. Henson &  Loader 2001,
2 O ECD  is the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. The mission of 
the O ECD  is to help its member countries to achieve sustainable economic growth and 
employment and to raise the standard of living in member countries while maintaining fi­
nancial stability — all this in order to contribute to the development of the world eco­
nomy. OECD has 30 member states, all developed and rich countries. http:// 
www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36761 863_1_1_1_1_1,00.htm l (29-10­
2008).
3 Since M ay  2008, Ja a p  van der Kloet has been working as a PhD for the Institute for 
Sociology of Law of Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands. The (preliminary) 
title of the research is Private regulation of food safety: concern or benefit for fresh 
produce growers in the Netherlands and Kenya. The research is funded by N W O , the 
Dutch organisation for scientific research.
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Reardon et. al. 2001, Dolan &  Humphrey 2004, Garcia Martinez &  Poole 
2004). The perspective of regulatees has received less attention. This is re­
markable because the expected advantages of private regulation partly rely 
on the supposition that in private regulation the regulatee and the regulator 
are the same. Private regulation is expected to be more effective than tradi­
tional governmental regulation because requirements are based on inside 
knowledge preventing practical obstacles in implementation and application. 
Moreover, private regulation is thought to be accepted more easily and to 
have a higher level of compliance because it concerns ‘own’ rules. Traditionally, 
private regulations are thought to originate from industry (industry association). 
Many new food regulations, however, are initiated by other private actors such 
as retailers or environmental organisations. Therefore, many private food regu­
lations cannot be regarded as pure ‘self-regulation’. Moreover, private regula­
tions develop through time: extension of requirements, changes in the organisa­
tion and governance structure and expansion of issues covered. W hat does it 
mean to be governed by private forms of regulation? In this paper we take a 
regulatee’s perspective and aim to explore the meaning of private food regu­
lation for those who are regulated by them. W e  do this by looking at the posi­
tion of regulatees in private regulatory regimes. Three factors seem to affect 
that position: 1 ) the level of exactingness of the regulation for the regulatee, 2) 
the level of voluntariness to stay out of the regulatory regime, 3) the level of 
the regulatee’s control over the regulatory regime.
The level of exactingness deals with the changes that regulatees have to 
implement in order to comply with the regulations. W e  argue that the exact­
ingness of those changes is different for regulatees who apply for certification 
for the first time and regulatees who are already certified and maintain to be 
so. Theoretically, compliance with a food regulatory regime can be either quite 
simple (because the regulatee already is in compliance with most of the norms 
from the outset) or very demanding (because the regulation requires funda­
mental adaptations). The more exacting these changes are for regulatees, the 
weaker their position.
The level of voluntariness to stay out of the regulatory regime, concerns the 
existence of legal, moral or economic forces on regulatees to comply with pri­
vate regulations. Does a potential regulatee have a choice not to join? Is joining 
the regulatory regime a decision under compulsion of external powers? Regu­
latees who are free to choose to stay out of the regulatory regime may be less 
dependent on other actors, such as the regulators or auditing organisations.
The level of the regulatee’s control over the regulatory regime is about the 
influence regulatees have in rule-making, monitoring compliance and enforce­
ment. To what extent are regulated firms involved in rule-making and monitor­
ing? Is a regulatee able to correct decisions that insufficiently take their own 
interests insufficiently into account? The more control regulatees have, the 
stronger their position. The downside of a situation in which regulatees have
ó
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captured the regulatory process is that it can be a motivator for more govern­
mental regulation (Henson &  Caswell 1 999). This issue, however, falls outside 
the scope of this paper. In addition to regulatees, three other private actors 
may be involved in private regulation: private actors who are part of the pro­
duction chain, but are not regulated themselves by the regulation at hand, such 
as suppliers and retailers; private actors providing services to the regulated 
industry, such as certification and auditing bureaus; and private actors outside 
the production chain, such as NGOs and consumers (Havinga 2008).
These three factors have led to the following five research questions:
1) How easy is it for regulatees to comply with private regulations?
2) Is joining the regulatory regime voluntary?
3) Who sets the rules and to what extent do regulatees have control over the 
rules?
4) Who monitors compliance and to what extent do regulatees have control 
over monitoring rules and decisions?
5) Who enforces compliance with these rules and to what extent do regu­
latees have control over enforcing rules and decisions?
In answering these questions we focus on one form of private regulation that, 
compared with other forms, involves most implications for regulatees: private 
standards. In general, private food standards contain norms that are more con­
crete and include sanctions in case of non-compliance. Other forms of private 
regulation, such as corporate social responsibility initiatives and codes of con­
duct, tend to allow a more non-committal attitude from regulatees (non- 
obligatory general principles without monitoring and sanctioning).
W e  applied the five research questions to four private food standards: the 
British Retail Consortium Global standard for food safety (BRC), G lobalGAP, 
the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) label, and EKO. In selecting private 
standards we aimed at broad variation. Two standards are business to busi­
ness standards initiated by retailers driven by self-interest (BRC and G lobal­
GAP). The other two standards are developed with idealistic intentions (sus­
tainable production) and involve a consumer-label (MSC and EKO). BRC, 
G lobalGAP, MSC and EKO are selected because they are dominant standards 
in their field (retail branded manufactured food products, primary food pro­
duce, fisheries and Dutch organic food). For this paper we studied the govern­
ance structure of the regulation and the standards documents. In our description 
we rely heavily on information the owners of the standards provide on their 
websites.
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PRIVATE FOOD STANDARDS
British Retail Consortium Global standard for food safety
The British Retail Consortium Global Standard for Food Safety is initially a 
standard for producers supplying Own Brand food products into UK supermar­
kets. It is currently used throughout the food industry.
Twenty years ago, food safety was not an important issue for most super­
market organisations. This has changed dramatically since. In the 1990s some 
major retailers generated their own comprehensive quality assurance scheme 
including unexpected inspections at farms, gardens and plants (e.g. Tesco and 
Sainsbury in the United Kingdom, Albert Heijn in the Netherlands).4 In 1996 the 
association of UK retailers (BRC) started to develop a common food safety 
standard to meet legal requirements.5
The aims of the BRC Global Standards are to improve supplier standards 
and consistency and avoid product failure, to eliminate multiple audit of food 
manufacturers, to support retailer objectives at all levels of the supply chain 
and to provide concise information to assist with a due diligence defence.6 The 
standard is regularly reviewed. The most recent version was published in Janu­
ary 2008. The name of the standard has been changed to ‘BRC Global Stand­
ard for Food Safety’. The standard applies particularly to manufacturers of 
retailer branded food products, but is also used for the manufacture of other 
processed food products.
How easy is it fo r  regulatees to comply with private regulations?
The BRC standard contains comprehensive norms with regard to food safety 
and quality systems, product and process management, and personal hygiene 
of personnel. The requirements of the standard are very extensive and cover a 
wide range of activities and include the management of incidents, a food sa­
fety plan based on a thorough HACCP study, handling for allergens, chemical 
and physical contamination control, medical screening of personnel, complaint 
handling, senior management commitment, traceability and site security. Many 
procedures must be documented.
Certification may be a demanding process, particularly at the first attempt, 
because of the wide range of subjects covered. However, the standard also 
might help to comply with legal regulations and to improve product quality. 
Food producers could use the standard as a detailed checklist and manage­
ment tool for ensuring safe products that are in compliance with legal regula­
tions.
4 See Havinga &  Jettinghoff 1999 for a description of the quality system of the Dutch 
leading supermarket Albert Heijn in 1994.
5 www.brc.org.uk/standards/about_background.htm (2005-02-18).
6 www.brc.org.uk/standards/background.htm (2004-06-21).
8
Nijmegen Sociology of Law W orking Papers Series 2 0 0 8 /0 7
Is  joining the regulatory regime voluntary?
Compliance with the ‘BRC Global Standard for Food Safety’ is not legally re­
quired. However, market forces do force many food manufacturers to comply 
with this or another retail food safety standard (such as the International Food 
Standard or Safe Quality Food). In the UK, The Netherlands, Germany and 
France all major retailers require manufacturers of own brand products to be 
certified (Havinga 2006, Fulponi 2006). A food producer or grower that lacks 
certification will be economically sanctioned. Major parties will not buy its pro­
ducts anymore. The purchasing power of supermarkets makes retail food sa­
fety standards in fact obligatory for many manufacturers.
W ho sets the rules and to what extent do regulatees have control over the rules? 
The first issues of the BRC Food standard seem to be developed by retailers 
only. Over the years other stakeholders became involved in setting the BRC 
standard (perhaps due to requirements of the Accreditation council). The British 
Retail Consortium states that representatives from major retailers, manufactu­
rers, certification bodies, United Kingdom Accreditation Service (UKAS) and 
trade associations contributed to the standard that was developed ‘under the 
leadership of the BRC and its members’.7 The website of BRC does not provide 
information on the members of the Technical Advisory Committee and the Stan­
dards Governance and Strategy Committee. It is clear however that the BRC 
still has a decisive voice. The standard is owned by the British Retail Consorti­
um.
W ho monitors compliance and to what extent do regulatees have control over 
monitoring rules and decisions?
In a private food safety certification scheme like BRC, a company that wants to 
be certified appoints an accredited certification body to audit the company. 
October 2008 worldwide 266 accredited certification bodies are recognised 
by the BRC to audit against the ‘BRC Global Standard for Food Safety’.8 All 
Certification Bodies who issue certificates are accredited by Independent Ac­
creditation Bodies, not by the British Retail Consortium. Product certification 
depends on continued compliance with the fundamental requirements of the 
Standard. Companies can be awarded with different grades (A, B, C, D). 
G rade D means that no certificate is issued and a full re-audit should be car­
ried out to gain certification. A grade D will be awarded in case one critical or 
major non-conformity against the ‘Statement of intent’ of a ‘fundamental’ re­
quirement is found, or one critical non-conformity, or three major non-confor­
mities, or two major non-conformities together with 21 minor non-conformities
7 www.brc.org.uk/standards/default.asp?mainsection_i=1&subsection_id = 1 (28-3-2008); 
similar but not mentioning UKAS and major retailers: www.brc.org.uk/standards/ 
about_background.htm (2005-02-18).
8 http://membersarea.brc.org.uk/directory/search.asp?dir=3 (1-10-2008).
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or one major and 31 minor non-conformities.9 Audits against the standards are  
scheduled. A company certified on grade A or B can opt fo r unannounced au­
dits.
W ho enforces compliance with these rules and to what extent do regulatees have 
control over enforcing rules and decisions?
An audit report has to be technically reviewed prior to the certification decision 
by the Certification Body. The person deciding to grant, suspend, revoke or 
renew certification should be independent to the auditor. Critical or major non­
conformity against fundamental requirements o f the standard should result in 
suspending or withholding the certification, and a new audit. O ther non­
conformities are fo llowed by corrective action and revisit.
Conclusion
The BRC G lobal Standard fo r Food Safety started as a UK standard owned 
and dominated by British retailers. In the initial phase, the regulated industry 
was not involved. Later, British food manufacturers (part o f the regulatees) we­
re consulted but still the decisive power is with the British retailers. N G O ’s, fo ­
reign retailers and food industry are not represented in the governance struc­
ture. The standard has expanded outside the UK and is not limited to own 
branded products o f retailers anymore.
GlobalGAP
GlobalGAP (G lobal Partnership fo r Good Agricultural Practices) is a private  
sector body that sets standards fo r the certification o f agricultural products 
around the g lobe.10 G lobalGAP started in 1997 as EurepGAP, which was an 
initiative by European retailers belonging to the Euro-Retailer Produce W o r­
king Group (EUREP). British retailers in conjunction with supermarkets in conti­
nental Europe were the driving forces. They reacted to growing concerns o f 
consumers regarding product safety, environmental and labour standards and 
decided to harmonise their own often very d iffe ren t standards.11 In the fo llo ­
wing years a growing number o f producers and retailers around the world  
joined in with the idea o f harmonising standards and procedures fo r the deve­
lopment o f Good Agricultural Practices (GAP). To align EurepGAPS’s name 
with the geographical reach o f its standards and to prevent confusion with its 
growing range o f public sector and civil society stakeholders, the Board deci­
ded to re-brand EurepGAP into G lobalGAP in September 2007. Since 1 Ja­
nuary 2008, G lobalGAP has come into effect.
9 BRC G loba l s tandard fo r Food sa fe ty  Issue 5 , Gu ide to  re -aud it timescale fo llow ing  
aw a rd ing  o f a G rade  D issue 1, 11 .07 .2008  (www .b rc .o rg .uk /s tandards 3 -10 -2008 ).
10 h t tp : /  / w w w .g loba lgap .o rg /cm s /fron t_con ten t.php? idca t=19  (10 -1 0 -2008 ).
11 h ttp ://w w w .g loba lgap .o rg /cm s /fro n t_ con ten t.p hp? id ca t= 19  (10 -1 0 -2008 ).
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GlobalGAP is a standard fo r the production o f primary agricultural p rod ­
ucts that covers the process o f the certified product from farm inputs like feed  
or seedlings and all farming activities until the product leaves the farm .12 The 
standard addresses norms pertaining to plant and livestock production, plant 
propagation materials and compound feed manufacturing.13 The importance o f 
these norms d iffers from, what G lobalGAP calls, major musts to minor musts to 
recommendations. The focus o f the standard, however, has been put more 
strongly on food safety and hygiene a t the expense o f environment and work­
er welfa re (Van der G rijp  et. al. 2005).
Certification programmes commonly use the incentives o f increased market 
access and premium prices to convince producers to meet certification stand­
ards and to become certified. In the case o f G lobalGAP, a crucial incentive for 
regulatees is to obtain (and maintain) their license-to-supply to the European 
supermarkets (Van der G rijp  et. al. 2005).
How easy is it  fo r  regulatees to comply with private regulations?
Compliance with G lobalGAP can be both simple and demanding. Compliance 
may be simple fo r those who are a lready in compliance with most o f the norms 
set by G lobalGAP, as they fo llow  a standard that is benchmarked against 
GlobalGAP. For other regulatees, compliance may be rather demanding. 
GlobalGAP involves a g rea t number o f (detailed) norms that cover all aspects 
of primary production and aspects o f animal we lfa re , environmental protection 
and worker welfare. Examples are traceab ility , propagation material, site his­
tory and site management, soil management, fertiliser use, irrigation, fe rtiga - 
tion, integrated pest management, plant protection products, hygiene policy 
and procedures, protective clothing, and farm waste management. Compliance 
with these norms may require adaptations in production methods. For major 
norms 100% compliance is compulsory, whereas fo r minor norms this is 95%. 
Recommendations are inspected but are not a prerequisite fo r the granting of 
a G lobalGAP certificate (Van der G rijp  et. al. 2005).
For small-scale producers, compliance seems more demanding than large- 
scale producers, because o f the considerable investments in capital and human 
resources (Van der G rijp  et. al. 2005). In Kenya, fo r example, smallholder 
farms and contracted large-scale farms face higher investment costs per acre 
to meet the requirements o f G lobalGAP standard than the exporter-owned  
farm , because they have not app lied fo r other certificates. Exporter-owned 
farms, on the contrary, a lready hold other certificates that were implemented 
in the same period as G lobalGAP or EurepGAP. These producers had to invest 
less a t lower costs in order to become G lobalGAP certified (Mausch et. al. 
2006).
12 h t tp : /  / w w w .g loba lgap .o rg /cm s /fron t_con ten t.php? idca t=19  (10 -1 0 -2008 ).
13 h t tp : /  / ww w .g loba lgap .o rg /cm s/fron t_con ten t.php? idca t=3  (1 0 -1 0 -2008 ).
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Is joining the regulatory regime voluntary?
Producers are free to decide whether or not to app ly  fo r G lobalGAP certifica­
tion. However, not all primary producers have another option than apply ing  
fo r certification. Increasingly, buyers o f their products, especially Western re­
tailers and supermarkets, demand G lobalGAP certification in order to guaran­
tee their customers safe and qualitative food. As a result G lobalGAP and other 
private standards become one o f the few keys le ft to gaining and maintaining 
access to (profitab le) markets.
W ho sets the rules and to what extend do regulatees have control over the rules? 
GlobalGAP has three types o f members: retailers and foodservice organisa­
tions, suppliers, and associate members such as certification bodies, consulting 
companies, universities, etc. G lobalGAP is governed by a Board that decides 
upon the vision and short- and long-term activity plan o f the organisation.14 The 
Board consists o f an equal number o f elected producer and re ta iler represent­
atives and is chaired by an independent chairperson. The day-to -day man­
agement o f the organisation and implementation o f policies and standards is 
ensured by a Secretariat, a German non-for-pro fit company, FoodPLUS 
GmbH.15 The G lobalGAP standard is developed, revised and maintained by 
Sector Committees that deal with technical decision-making on specific sector 
and product issues. Sector Committees are elected by producer and re ta iler 
members.
W ho monitors compliance and to what extent do regulatees have control over 
monitoring rules and decisions?
Compliance is monitored by producers themselves through self-assessments and 
through inspections and audits by independent certification organisations. Pro­
ducers that app ly  fo r certification must register with a Certification Body a p ­
proved by G lobalGAP. The Certification Body and the app ly ing producer sign 
a contract in which the producer commits himself to G lobalGAP rules and de ­
clares to communicate all relevant and updated data related to the production 
to the Certification Body. The Certification Body confirms the registration and, 
if all app licab le compliance criteria are met, also certification. The contract 
between the Certification Body and producer may have an initial duration of 
up to three years, with subsequent renewal or extension fo r periods up to three 
years.16
Each approved Certification Body can have its own fee structure and must 
have a penalty procedure that addresses non-conformance with the G loba l­
GAP standard. A producer may change from one Certification Body to anoth­
14 G loba lG AP  (EurepGAP), G enera l Regulations. In tegra ted Farm Assurance, Version 3.0- 
2_Sep07, V a lid  from  30 September 2007 .
15 h t tp : /  / w w w .g loba lgap .o rg /cm s/fron t_con ten t.php? idca t=  15.
16 G loba lG AP , G enera l Regulations, p. 11.
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er, unless he is sanctioned by the Certification Body. The Certification Body 
Committee consists o f certification bodies that are members o f G lobalGAP. 
Each Certification Body is specialised in certifying one or more specific agricul­
tural products that fa ll within the scope o f G lobalGAP. The main function o f the 
Certification Body Committee is to harmonise the interpretation o f the compli­
ance criteria set by Sector Committees.17
W ho enforces compliance with these rules and to what extent do regulatees have 
control over enforcing rules and decisions?
Compliance with the G lobalGAP standard is enforced by G lobalGAP- 
approved Certification Bodies. In case a producer does not comply with the 
app licab le major and /o r minor norms or violates agreements in the contract 
with the Certification Body, G lobalGAP provides three types o f sanctions. 
Sanctions are app lied to the producer as well as to the product. In case o f non­
compliance, the producer first receives a warning and agrees with the Certifi­
cation Body about the time period (maximum 28 calendar days) in which the 
non-conformance will be corrected. In case a major control point is not com­
plied with, the Certification Body can decide to shorten this period in case the 
non-compliance is critical in terms o f safety fo r people, environment and con- 
sumers.18 Secondly, when a producer cannot show sufficient corrective action 
a fte r a warning, a suspension is issued. The Certification Body decides what 
period (maximum six months) is allowed fo r correcting the non-compliance. Dur­
ing that time, the producer is not allowed to use the G lobalGAP trademark or 
logo, certificate or any other document that is related to G lobalGAP. A sus­
pension can be partia l or complete. In case o f a partia l suspension, only certain 
parts o f the certified production are suspended. For example, if apples and 
cherries are certified, a partia l suspension can be issued fo r the cherry produc­
tion. In case o f a complete suspension, all certified products are suspended. If 
the cause o f the suspension has not resolved within the given time period, the 
Certification Body w ill cancel the contract.19 A cancellation o f the contract can 
also be issued when non-compliance leads to doubts about the integrity o f the 
producer or when major contractual agreements are not complied with. Then, a 
producer is not allowed to use the G lobalGAP trademark or logo, certificate  
or any other document that is re lated to G lobalGAP a t all. A producer whose 
contract has been cancelled may not re-submit fo r G lobalGAP certification 
within one year a fte r the date o f cancellation.
17 G loba lG AP  (EurepGAP), G enera l Regulations. In tegra ted Farm Assurance, Version 3.0- 
2_Sep07, V a lid  from  30 September 2007 .
18 G loba lG AP , G enera l Regulations, p. 28.
19 G loba lG AP , G enera l Regulations, p. 29.
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Conclusion
Initially, G lobalGAP started as a private standard fo r food safety which was 
dominated by European retailers. Later, also producers and more retailers and 
supermarkets from around the world became members o f G lobalGAP. Now, 
producers and retailers are equally represented in decision-making bodies. 
Monitoring and enforcing compliance are responsibilities o f the G lobalGAP  
Certification Bodies.
M arine Stewardship Council
The Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) is a label fo r sustainable fishery and 
was established in 1997 by the W orld  W ide  Fund fo r Nature (WWF) and Uni­
lever. The multinational food company Unilever found over-fishing a threat to 
its future fishing activities. The non-governmental environmental organisation 
W W F considered a specific label an interesting option fo r promoting sustaina­
ble development (Oosterveer 2005: 161, Tully 2004: 3).
The MSC standard, called ‘Principles and Criteria o f Sustainable Fishing’, is 
based on the FAO Code o f Conduct fo r Responsible Fisheries and the Code of 
Good Practice fo r Setting Social and Environmental Standards (ISEAL). The 
standard is based on 3 principles (maintenance o f the ta rge t fish stock, minimal 
environmental impact and effective management) and 31 performance indica­
tors. The standard is science-based and applies to w ild-capture fisheries 
(whatever their size, type or location) and does not app ly  to aquaculture. The 
client asking fo r assessment can either be a fishing company, a fishermen’s as­
sociation or a governmental organization. A ‘certified fishery’ can involve one 
of the vessels o f a fishing company or hundreds o f trawlers from d iffe rent 
owners. Currently over 120 fisheries are engaged in the MSC programme (35 
certified, 78 under assessment and 20 to 30 in pre-assessment).20 Use o f the 
MSC eco label is only permitted on seafood from a fishery certified to the 
MSC standard fo r sustainable fishing handled by members o f the supply chain 
(processors, retailers, restaurants) certified against the MSC ‘Chain o f custody 
standard’ fo r seafood traceab ility .21
How easy is it  fo r  regulatees to comply with private regulations?
For a fishery meeting all the requirements fo r full assessment against the MSC 
standard is very demanding. Assessing the sustainability o f a fishery is a com­
plex, timely and public process. It involves financial costs,22 time input from sta ff 
and implementing actions to improve sustainability and performance if re ­
20 h t tp : /  / www .m sc.o rg /newsroom /press_re leases/a rch ive -2008 /an ta rc tic -k rill-fishery-en- 
ters-marine-stewardship (10 -1 0 -2008 ).
21 ww w .m sc.o rg /ge t-ce rtified /supp ly -cha in  (10 -1 0 -2008 ).
22 Cost o f certifica tion can va ry  between $25 ,000  (USD) and $ 500 ,0 00  (USD) 
h ttp : /  / ww w .m sc.o rg /ge t-ce rtified /fisheries /know -the-bas ics 1 4 -10 -2008 .
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quired. Actors such as regulators, agencies and environmental groups are invit­
ed to partic ipate in the assessment process.
For members o f the supply chain certification often is quite easy because 
they a lready operate product identification and tracking systems fo r other 
purposes (e.g. to comply with European regulation or other food standards). 
The certifier only has to verify  that products from certified fisheries are not 
mixed with products from uncertified fisheries.
Is joining the regulatory regime voluntary?
The MSC standard is voluntary. In course o f time several supermarkets, fish res­
taurants and seafood retailers pre fer to sell MSC labelled seafood (Roheim 
2003). As a consequence, the pressure fo r fisheries to engage in MSC is in­
creasing.
W ho sets the rules and to what extend do regulatees have control over the rules? 
The initial governance structure o f MSC (partnership between Unilever en 
W W F) was criticised by NGOs as lacking due credib ility , democratic repre­
sentativeness and effectiveness (Tully 2004:3). Since 2000, the MSC is gov­
erned by the Board o f Trustees advised by the Technical Advisory Board and 
the Stakeholder Council (established in 2002).23 Trustees are chosen fo r their 
knowledge and support fo r the MSC. The Board should represent d iffe ren t sec­
tors and geographical regions. New Board members are recommended by 
existing trustees and there must be consensus among all Board members on the 
appointment. Representative from the fishing industry and scientists seem to 
dominate the Board.24 The Technical Advisory Board (TAB) advises the Board 
on the MSC Standards, develops methodologies fo r certification and accredita­
tion and reviews the progress o f fisheries certifications. Existing TAB members 
propose new TAB members and recommend them to the MSC Board. The Board 
appoints new members, with the aim o f bringing a range o f experience, skills 
and geographical representation to the TAB.25 MSC certified fisheries are not 
members o f MSC, they do not have any formal influence on the rules and their 
interpretation. In the assessment process and in re-assessment, industry and en­
vironmental stakeholders do have the formal opportunity to give their view and 
to object to decisions taken.
23 www .m sc.org /about-us/governance/s tructu re (10 -1 0 -2008 ).
24  Based on in formation p rov ided on the trustees on www .m sc.org /about- 
us/governance /s tructu re /board-o f-trustees/w hos-on-the-m sc-board (10 -1 0 -2008 ).
2 5  h ttp ://www .m sc.o rg /abou t-us /gove rnance /s tru c tu re /techn ica l-adv iso ry -boa rd /w hos-on -  
the-msc-tab (14 -1 0 -2008 ).
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W ho monitors compliance and to what extent do regulatees have control over 
monitoring rules and decisions?
The fishery appoints an independent certifier that must be accredited by Ac­
creditation Services International to certify fisheries against the MSC environ­
mental standard fo r sustainable fishing. The certifier  issues fishery certificates 
and conducts the audits during the lifetime o f a fishery certificate. The certifier 
appoints a fishery assessment team to assess fisheries against the MSC stand­
ard. The team uses information provided by the client fishery and stakeholders 
to score a fishery on set criteria in order to reach a judgment about whether 
the fishery meets the MSC standard.26
When a fishery meets the MSC standard fo r sustainable fishing, its ce rtifi­
cate is valid fo r 5 years. During this period the fishery will be visited a t least 
once a year to check that it continues to meet the MSC standard. The certifier 
does have the right however, to conduct an unannounced audit a t any time or 
schedule more frequent audits if circumstances indicate the need. Each audit 
will examine any significant changes that might have occurred either in the 
physical environment or in the management o f the fishery. Each audit w ill also 
examine whether the client is satisfactorily addressing all certification condi­
tions. A fte r 5 years, the fishery must be reassessed if it wants to remain in the 
program.
W ho enforces compliance with these rules and to what extent do regulatees have 
control over enforcing rules and decisions?
The certifier can suspend or w ithdraw the certificate. Failure to make adequate  
progress can be enough justification fo r the certifier to suspend or w ithdraw the 
certificate.27
Conclusion
From a partnership between a major food company (Unilever) and an envi­
ronmental NGO (WWF), the Marine Stewardship Council was transformed in 
an independent organization. The Board o f Trustees and the Technical Advisory  
Board are composed o f scientists and representatives from the fishing industry, 
chosen fo r their expertise by cooptation. Regulated fisheries are not formally  
represented but almost half o f the board members have a background in fish­
ing. In this standard also private and public actors outside the food chain are  
involved, such as environmental NGOs and governmental organizations.
26 h t tp : /  / ww w .m sc.o rg /ge t-ce rtified /fisheries /know -the-bas ics (14 -1 0 -2008 ).
27  h t tp : /  / w w w .m sc .o rg /ge t-ce rtif ied /fishe ries /a fte r-ce rtifica tio n#pos t-ce rtifica tio n -requ ire -  
ments (14 -1 0 -2008 ).
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EKO
EKO is a Dutch product label fo r organically produced agricultural products. 
Products that are EKO certified fo r more than 95%  of organic ingredients. EKO 
is d iffe ren t from the other three standards presented above in three ways. 
Firstly, EKO is owned by a private foundation, Skal, but based on governmen­
tal regulation. The other standards are based on private regulation. Secondly, 
Skal is a certification organisation and owner o f the EKO label. The owners of 
the other three standards do not certify themselves, but leave this to independ­
ent certification bodies. Thirdly, Skal has a formal monopoly on the certification 
of organic products in the Netherlands. As fo r the other three standards ce rtifi­
cation is performed by several d iffe ren t certification bodies. The term ‘organic’ 
is lega lly protected by EU regulation defining under what circumstances a g ri­
cultural products are organically produced. The main EU regulation in this re­
spect is Regulation Nr. 2092 /91  fo r organic production methods.28 In the Neth­
erlands, the requirements set in this regulation have been implemented by the 
Ministry o f Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality (LNV) through the agricultural 
quality regulation (Landbouwkwaliteitswet). In this regulation, the private o r­
ganisation Skal was assigned responsibility fo r controlling compliance with o r­
ganic production methods in the Netherlands.
Skal was founded as Stichting Ekomerk Controle (Foundation fo r controlling 
EKO label) in 1985 and operates as Skal (Foundation fo r controlling a lte rna­
tive agriculture) since 1992. According to its website (www.skal.nl), Skal is the 
independent control organisation fo r the organic agriculture, trade and food  
industry. Skal aims to promote the correct indication o f organically produced 
agricultural products by means o f control, inspections, and certification.29 This 
means that a product that claims to be organic, is indeed organically p ro ­
duced. Skal describes organic agriculture as sustainable production that can be 
achieved by measures such as care fo r vivid and fe rtile  soil, application of 
preventive crop protection, and manuring with organic manure and natural 
minerals.30 1,480 organic farmers and more than 1,200 organic processors, 
importers, and trade companies are controlled by Skal.31
EKO addresses actors in the production chain who produce, process, store, 
import and sell products. EKO defines each o f these d iffe ren t actors as suppli­
ers. In case a certified supplier has not produced, processed, stored, imported  
the certified product himself, the supplier is responsible fo r guaranteeing the 
original producer has met the EKO norms.
28 As from 1 January 2 009 , EU Regulation Nr. 8 3 4 /2 0 0 7  and Nr. 8 8 9 /2 0 0 8  w ill become 
app licab le .
29  Skal, Statuten, 20  August 2003 .
30 Skal, Skal-normen, 29  M ay  2008 .
31 h t tp : /  / w w w .ska l.n l/P o rta ls /0 /N ede rlands /P D F /In foS ka l.p d f.
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How easy is it  fo r  regulatees to comply with private regulations?
Organic farm ing is a way o f living, it demands conviction to choose fo r organic 
production methods. Those who are regulated by EKO must have knowledge  
about nature and what instruments nature provides fo r making p ro fit with o r­
ganic agriculture. EKO norms touch upon the entire operational management of 
a farm, fishery or other agricultural production unit. EKO norms set require­
ments fo r the production process, the (design o f the) product, a quality plan, 
and fo r a complaint procedure. Organic farmers, processors and traders are  
obliged to pay a fee when apply ing fo r certification and pay an annual con­
tribution depending on the number o f activities that are certified. Regulatees 
may be stimulated in complying with EKO by the several d iffe ren t subsidies 
that are ava ilab le fo r organic agriculture.
Is joining the regulatory regime voluntary?
Choosing fo r organic agriculture is voluntary. Organic agriculture is not domi­
nating the market. So market dominance does not cause pressure to opt fo r 
organic production. In the Netherlands, only 2% o f the agricultural produced 
foods is organic.32 Organic farmers in the Netherlands earn an income compa­
rab le with that o f conventional farmers (Melita 2000:202). However, an or­
ganic farmer who wants to sell his products as ‘organic’ has the legal ob liga ­
tion to be EKO certified, because EKO is based on public regulation.
W ho sets the rules and to what extent do regulatees have control over the rules? 
The EKO standard is based on regulation o f organic production that has been 
formulated by the European Commission in 1991. Skal has formulated some 
additional rules on issues not covered by European Regulation Nr. 2 0 92 /9 1 . 
These so-called Skal-norms are only app licab le in some specific situations and 
can be seen as elucidations o f the norms set in the European Regulation. Skal 
applies its Skal-norms only in conjunction with the European Regulation.
Since 2002 the OBR (Overlegorgaan Biologische Regelgeving -  Consulta­
tive Body Organic Regulation) is a platform fo r all stakeholders (association of 
organic farmers, association o f organic trading and processing, agricultural 
organisations, retailers association, environmental NGO, Commodity Boards for 
Meat, Poultry and Eggs and fo r Agriculture) to discuss organic regulations.33 
The OBR advises Skal, the Netherlands Department o f Agriculture and indirect­
ly the European Commission. Skal and the Ministry o f Agriculture are associate 
members (observer) o f OBR.
32 Voedsel en W a ren  Au to rite it, Biologische landbouw in Nederland: ketenstructuur en 
voedselve iligheid van d ie rlijke  producten. 2004 : 4. (h ttp : //w w w .vw a .n l/p o r ta l/p a -  
ge?_page id=  119 ,1639827&_dad=po rta l& _schem a=PO R TAL&p_ file_ id=  10566 , 2 4 ­
10-2008 ).
33 ww w .b io log ica .n l/de ta il_page .=Be le id_en_rege ls_O BR_TW  (24 -10 -2008 ).
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W ho monitors compliance and to what extent do regulatees have control over 
monitoring rules and decisions?
In the Netherlands, Skal is the only certification and inspection organisation that 
is responsible fo r monitoring compliance with rules fo r organic production. In 
other European Union countries, other organisations are responsible. Rules for 
certification (content and method) are decided by the Board o f Skal. The 
Board consists o f a chairperson, general management and executive commit­
tee. The chairperson is recommended by the Board and assigned by the Minis­
ter o f Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality. The general management consists 
of four members who claim to represent main parts o f organic production in the 
Netherlands. These organisations are the association o f organic production and 
trad ing, the association o f Dutch retailers, the organisation o f Dutch agriculture 
and horticulture, and the federation o f organic farmers. The executive commit­
tee consists o f two persons who were elected because o f their relevant 
knowledge and skills.
Inspections are carried out by Skal or by organisations that inspect on be­
ha lf o f Skal. Inspections can be both announced and unannounced. Certified  
suppliers are inspected a t least once a year. In addition, extra inspections can 
take place that are aimed a t specific elements in a production process, fo r ex ­
ample a financial inspection. Suppliers are ob liged to allow the inspector ac­
cess to all company units and relevant documents such as the quality plan, f i ­
nancial administration and complaint record.
W ho enforces compliance with these rules and to what extent do regulatees have 
control over enforcing rules and decisions?
Skal is responsible fo r enforcing compliance with EKO. If suppliers violate EKO 
norms, Skal is allowed to impose sanctions, depending on the type o f violation. 
Skal distinguishes three types o f violations: small, serious, and fa ta l. In case o f 
a small violation, when the violation has no direct influence on the product, sup­
pliers are reprimanded and a period is agreed fo r correction. This sanction is 
also app licab le fo r applicants o f certification. A serious violation concerns a 
violation o f norms that directly influences the product or involves a situation that 
a small violation is not corrected within the agreed time period. In these cases 
Skal is allowed to suspend the certificate or cancel the application fo r certifica­
tion. O ther sanctions may be imposing fines or putting suppliers, on their own 
costs, under close control. Fatal violations relate to situations in which inspections 
result in serious doubts about the activities o f the supplier or when serious v io la ­
tions are not corrected within the given time period. Fatal violations are sanc­
tioned by cancellation o f the certificate. This sanction can also be imposed 
when financial obligations are not met.
Severe violation o f EKO norms may result in criminal prosecution. In case a 
violation falls within the jurisdiction o f criminal law, Skal is obliged to inform the 
inspection department o f the Ministry o f Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality.
19
Van der Kloet and Havinga: Private Food Regulation
This only happened once. In July 2006, Skal informed the inspection depa rt­
ment o f the ministry suspecting a large mushroom farmer having sold 400,000  
‘normal’ mushrooms as organic mushrooms. On 1 6 October 2008 this case was 
brought to court.
Conclusion
Initially, in the Netherlands organic production was regulated by the private  
organisation Stichting Eko-merk Controle (predecessor o f Skal). This situation 
changed with the entering into force o f European Regulation Nr. 2092 /91  in 
the Netherlands. In 1 992 the Dutch ministry o f LNV assigned Skal responsibility 
fo r monitoring and enforcing compliance with the, publicly set, rules fo r organic 
production. The division o f tasks in regulating organic production between the 
ministry and Skal has maintained in the Netherlands.
CONCLUSION
The four cases above show that the internal organisation and governance struc­
ture o f private food standards varies highly. From the perspective o f regu­
latees, three aspects o f a food standard seem particularly important: 1) the 
level o f exactingness o f the standard fo r the regulatee, 2) the level o f volun­
tariness to stay out o f the standard, and 3) the level o f the regulatee’s control 
over the regulatory regime.
The first aspect tries to distinguish between standards that are easy to 
comply with (e.g. because the existing practice is a lready to a high extent in 
compliance with the standard) and standards that are very hard to comply 
with. Based on the number and character o f the norms o f the standards we ex­
pect all four standards to be moderate to very demanding fo r regulatees a p ­
plying fo r certification against the standard fo r the first time. How much e ffo rt 
it takes to continue compliance a fte r the first certification against the standard  
remains unclear. For an accurate assessment o f the exactingness o f a standard  
a more in-depth study is needed; a desk study is not sufficient.
As to the level o f voluntariness o f the standard, we examined to what ex­
tent a regulatee is lega lly or morally ob liged, or forced by the market to join 
the standard. In a private food certification scheme a potential regulatee has 
to take action to become a regulatee: a company should register fo r certifica­
tion. This d iffers from public regulation: no action is required to be governed 
by the law, the status o f regulatee is gained automatically.
Regulatees are free to app ly  fo r certification against one o f the four food  
standards. A legal obligation to app ly  fo r certification is to ta lly absent in BRC, 
GlobalGAP and MSC. In the Netherlands, all products with the indication ‘o r­
ganic’ or the EKO Quality symbol are lega lly required to be certified by Skal.
Not legal obligations, but market forces seem to be the most important 
driver that makes private food standards less voluntary in course o f time. The
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more a food standard succeeds in achieving a dominant position in the market, 
the more ob liga to ry joining the standard fo r regulatees w ill be. A food stand­
ard can achieve a dominant position either because major retailers require 
certification from suppliers or because consumers pre fer products with a partic­
ular label.
All together, currently the Marine Stewardship Council label is the most 
voluntary standard. The BRC food standard is the most ob liga tory , a t least in 
the United Kingdom, because all major UK retailers require all suppliers of 
‘own labe l’ food products to be certified against the BRC food standard. BRC 
did not succeed in becoming the world ’s only retail food standard. For manu­
facturers supplying retailers outside the UK, the BRC standard is less ob liga to ­
ry. However, all major retailers in Western Europe do require from suppliers of 
own branded foods to be certified against BRC or another retail food stand­
ard such as IFS or SQF. A manufacturer might be ab le to opt fo r an alternative  
retail food standard; however it is the reta ile r who decides which standard(s) 
are required (and whether the supplier is le ft a choice). W e estimate G loba l­
GAP to be a little more voluntary, particularly because the standard is not re­
quired from all suppliers by all major retailers yet; we expect this coverage 
within a few years. Compared to BRC, G lobalGAP is a more monopolist stand­
ard dominating the market o f agricultural produce almost completely without 
serious competing alternative standards.
As to the level o f control, none o f the four standards is self-regulatory, in 
the sense that the regulatees are the regulators a t the same time. The only 
standard that has a membership fo r regulatees, allowing regulatees to vote fo r 
representatives in the governing structure, is G lobalGAP. Regulatees have to 
share their control mutually with the retailers in G lobalGAP. Both Marine Stew­
ardship Council and the EKO standard have some procedures fo r representing 
regulatees in the governance structure and fo r individual regulatees to express 
their opinion or object to decisions. MSC does not have a membership structure. 
Members o f the Board o f Trustees and the Technical Advisory Board are cho­
sen by cooptation; however half o f the members have a background in fishery. 
MSC offers some opportunities fo r an individual regulatee to partic ipate in 
decision-making: a fishery is consulted over the assessment structure and per­
formance indicators that w ill be app lied and can make an objection against an 
unfair decision o f the certification body. The EKO standard is based on Euro­
pean and Dutch legislation, and Skal only decides on interpretation and on 
additional norms. Farmers’ organisations are represented in the Board o f Skal. 
As fo r the BRC G loba l Food standard, regulatees are not included a t all in the 
governance structure. Control over this standard is restricted to members o f the 
BRC, the owner o f the standard. BRC is the only standard from the four that is 
owned by an old-established organisation not specially created to own and 
develop the standard. Through the years some opportunities were created for 
regulatees and other stakeholders to give their opinion on the BRC standard.
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W e can characterize private food standards by the level o f voluntariness 
and the level o f control by regulatees. This is visualised in the follow ing figure.
Figure 1: Estimated position o f regulatees in private food  standards a t the start 
and today
Two main developments or trends can be concluded from figure 1. W ith re­
spect to the level o f voluntariness, all four standards have developed from an 
in itia lly voluntary standard to a more ob liga to ry standard. This has to do with 
our selection o f standards; we selected standards that are the most important 
in their fie ld . A food standard that does not have a strong position in the mar­
ket w ill p robab ly not show this development towards a more ob liga to ry one 
fo r regulatees.
The trend in the other factor, the level o f control o f regulatees over the 
standard, is less obvious. Two standards (G lobalGAP and MSC) clearly show a 
development towards more control fo r regulatees. In both standards this 
change was introduced rather quickly, in the initial phase some years a fte r the
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start. More control fo r regulatees over the years is not a general trend howev­
er, as the other standards show. The EKO standard developed in the opposite 
direction: in itia lly a private initiative by organic farmers and other stakehold­
ers to promote ecological farm ing, transformed into a standard based on EU 
and Dutch regulations leaving only a consultative role fo r representatives o f the 
regulatees (and other stakeholders).The BRC standard, by contrast, only incor­
porated a very marginal role fo r regulatees (and other stakeholders) in the 
governance structure. These differences in development may be explained by 
the need fo r regulators to share control with and be considerate o f the interests 
of regulatees (and other stakeholders) in order to become or maintain a dom i­
nant position in food markets.
This paper clearly shows that the time dimension is important in characteriz­
ing and comparing food safety standards.
Our study o f the governance structure and standards documents provides 
some prelim inary insights in the importance a private food standard might 
have fo r regulatees. To gain a more complete and re liab le answer our next 
step should be to turn to the regulatees to learn about their perspective. W e  
intend to interview regulatees, particularly growers o f vegetables, in the Neth­
erlands and Kenya on their experiences with and views on private food stand­
ards such as G lobalGAP.
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